Categorical Imperative

12.  Intentionality is categorical, and a categorical imperative, but in a limited sense.  Intentionality need not necessarily predicate some universal end, some once and for all state of being on the order of "happiness" or "pleasure," though intentionality, as such, precludes neither.  One might imagine easily enough that the satisfaction of intentionality as pleasant and in that pleasure a source of happiness, but we know such pleasure and the happiness it brings is contingent upon the satisfaction of a given desire, the fulfillment of a given end, and we know that to be transient -- an end to this intentionality, but an end that always seems to beg the question, "ok, but now what?" -- the fulfillment of this intentionality, but a fulfillment that leaves one empty of motive, in a null state, awaiting an intentionality that will brings me into being once again.   Moreover, we know that this intentionality, with the prototypical exemplar of being hungry, does not preclude another intentionality.  To say, "I am hungry," does not preclude the fact that I may well also be in the throes of sexual desire, each competing for my attention, each providing an imperative to act, each immediate, and compelling, and perhaps even competing.  To satisfy one desire is not to satisfy the other desire, and each is irreducible to the other.  My happiness in one is not my happiness in another, and the difference between the intentionality game brought into being by one is irreducible to the intentionality game bought into being by another.  Copulating is not eating, and eating is not copulating.