Intentionality

1.  Let me begin with a distinction between intentionality and instrumentality.   I could have used the more familiar ends and means, except those terms are fraught and broader than what I intend for intentionality and instrumentality.  To use a common and prototypical example, hunger I would consider an intentionality, a state-of-being implicit to our physiological make-up.  Hunger is both a motive for and a measure of instrumental action -- that is to say, it motivates us to act and, in its gratification, a measure of efficacy for our actions, some being more, others being less effective toward moving one, so to speak, from a state-of-hunger to a state-of-satisfaction.

2.  Another subtle set of distinctions -- the distinction between intention and intentionality.  When we say, "I intend to do X," we have certain background assumptions, not least that we are conscious of our intent to to do X and that it is subject, in one way or another, to the question, "why?" and there is some answer to the question, some reason for doing X.  We say, "I am doing X because Y," and Y stands outside and before X.  To use our prototypical example, "I intend to eat," is subject to the question, "why?" and though the answer is generally predictable, "I intend to eat because I am hungry," it nevertheless makes sense.  In other words, it makes sense to speak of the intentionality (Y) motivating and measuring an instrumental act (X).  It does not make sense, at least not in the same way, to speak of the intention of an intentionality.  "Why are you hungry?" yields the response -- "because I am" -- or a description of the circumstance or physiology giving rise to the intentionality -- "because I haven't eaten in two days!"   In yet other words, the intentionality is given, a priori, and intention arises instrumentally in response to a given intentionality.   There is an implication here that intention, the instrumental act, unlike the intentionality governing that instrumental act, is 'free.'  As Rawls says in summary of Butler, "agents can select between various alternative actions, depending on their circumstances and the various constraints to which they are subject.  The class of alternatives is within their powers; they are able to do and not to do any of these actions.  Which available action an agent will do depends upon the agent's beliefs, desires, and assessment of the consequences of the possible action, as understood by the agent."