Form of Life

10.  Here I want to adapt a term from Wittgenstein, intentionality game, and say something like, "intentionality brings into being a form of life," not only as a "me" uniquely constituted and situated, but insofar as we share a common intentionality, a "me" comprehensible to others.  We are, of course, more complex than ameoba, and that complexity has consequence.  Our acts as agents are governed by multiple intentionalities, and we need never necessarily assume that our intentionalities or our acts are in concert (justified to one another).  Nevertheless, analytically, the governing principles are the same -- that is to say, "form of life," for the moment, is used in this limited sense of acts governed by a single intentionality, an intentionality game, of which it makes some sense to ask, "how is it played?"  Given an intentionality, hunger, I am free to do anything, but not everything will satisfy my hunger.  There are certain things I must do, and those things are physiologically determined -- e.g. I must ingest food.  What does (and what does not) count as "food" is determined, mechanistically, before any choice I might make as an agent, and that brings into being a semantic, a world differentiated between food (and all that is not-food).   Likewise, given an intentionality, hunger, you are free to do anything, but not everything will satisfy your hunger.  There are certain things you must do, and those things are likewise physiologically determined -- you too must ingest food.  What does (and what does not) count as "food" is determined, mechanistically, before any choice you might make as an agent, and insofar as our physiology is "common," we share likewise a "common" semantic, a world mutually differentiated between food (and all that is not food).  As I observe you, as you observe me, the instrumentality of our instrumental acts, our ingesting food, signifies a common intentionality, renders each comprehensible to the other.