The Democratic State

To make clear what is at stake here, let me first distinguish between a "polis" and an "institution."  The polis I want to define as any recognizable aggregate of people, for the most part geographic.  A major city stands as a polis.  The difference between a polis and an institution, analytically, can be revealed by asking the question what is the governing intentionality of each.  I want to say neither Salt Lake City nor New York City have a governing intentionality, but they do have institutions -- city government, the police, the metropolitan opera, and the like -- and it is relatively easy to articulate a governing intentionality (a mission and purpose) for each.   It was, I think, the great genius of the framers to recognize this distinction implicitly, and upend what is traditional by placing the polis over the institution.

Both the theocratic and ideological states want to give governing intentionality to the polis -- that is to say, turn the polis into an institution.  Winthrop, for example, wanted the Plymouth settlement to be a city on the hill, a shining example of the Puritan faith, and as such provided governing imperatives for each and all.  Lenin, for example, wanted the Soviet state to be the harbinger of the world wide communist revolution, and as such provided governing imperatives for each and all.  It is, of course, somewhat more complex, but whether one credits the will of god or the will of history, in both cases, the state must then be free to act on behalf of the governing intentionality, reducing individuals to instruments to that end.

The democratic state substitutes the will of the people for the will of God (a substitution that particularly galls the conservative evangelical for whom the will of God, as revealed, can not be supplanted).  It might be argued that the will of the people is no more no less a contingent, historically determined fiction than the will of God, and I will argue as much insofar as the will of the people is revealed through institutions no less than the will of God.  Consider, for example, the "vote," such as it is.  Given opposing courses of action, the vote reveals the will of the people, and often winners and losers,  a majority and minority opinion, the latter of which might be called the opposing faction because, as I suggested to a colleague, losers are typically neither gracious in defeat nor persuaded by the vote itself.  Consider also, for example, the notion of the market place, such as it is.  Given opposing courses of action, the market place reveals the will of the people, and often winners and losers, the invidious comparisons of pecuniary emulation, to invoke Veblen.  Relative to the individual, the so-called "invisible hand" of the marketplace substitutes for the invisible hand of God and bestows grace on the winners, penury on the losers, and as such carries not only utilitarian significance, but also moral significance as well.  The successful are the virtuous, a paradigm upheld more in the supposition than in the examination of fact (e.g. that "hard work" and a sort of native "cleverness" are the virtues most in demand, and that anyone in possession of these virtues can rise to the top).  So long as there are institutions to keep the peace on the streets (e.g. the police) and so long as there are governing norms (e.g. the constitution, which substitutes for the sacred text, and the first amendment right to speech) the state can subsist, as a polis, without a governing intentionality.

There is the broad outline, and what is most called for (I believe) is a post-democratic state that is not regressive the to the barbarian or the theocratic, but difficult to imagine.  As with any substitution, and the will of the people for the will of God (or history), there are consequences, not least what might be called the "primacy of rhetoric."  This carries the full freight of the platonic distinction between dialectic (aimed at truth) and rhetoric (aimed at persuasion).  Within the polis, moral efficacy rises, not with the dialectical apprehension of truth, but in what most can be persuaded to believe. Here again, this is particularly galling to those who would believe that there is truth, that it is apprehensible to human beings, and that truth should govern, not a transient social majority.  This plays out on two fronts, the one being religion, the other being science, both of which ostensibly aim at truth once and for all.  Consider, for example, the following from the correspondence section of the newspaper:

"I find it curious that Latter-Day Saints who are Democrats sincerely feel they are taking the high road on social issues, when actually the opposite is true.  What these misinformed Mormon Democrats fail to realize is that we are obligated as individuals to help the needy through voluntary donation of our time and resources, but it should never be done through the forced process of involuntary, confiscatory taxation!  There is a huge difference between those two philosophies.  One way is very good; the other way is evil through and through.  This is apparently not understood by those well-meaning members.  If they stopped to think about it, they would realize that it was Satan's plan to force us all to be good (Democratic strategy) but Christ taught us to do good of our own free choice (Republican plan)  If everyone understood this simple correct principle, there would be no more liberals." SL Tribune, Sep 10, 2012.

There are any number of difficulties with Mr. James C. Green's argument, so many that it would take a chapter to address them all.  I bring it forward to point out that his fundamental position is theocratic, not democratic (though one suspects he would feel he is both).  Within the polis, the majority  can be persuaded to create an institution whose governing intentionality it is, so to speak, to provide alms to those in need.  Within the polis, the majority can be persuaded to levy a tax to fund the institution whose governing intentionality it is to provide alms to those in need, and do so on privately held good Christian principles.  Ostensibly, within the polis, those who disagree, as apparently Mr. Green would disagree, can likewise exercise rhetoric to persuade a majority to disband the welfare institution in favor of private giving.  Given the opportunity, one suspects Mr. Green, not unlike the mullahs of the middle east, would impose the "simple correct principle," regardless of the majority opinion, in part because, to his mind, the majority opinion is so obviously false.  Truth should prevail over mere opinion.        



PS the barbarian state and the imperial state I see as roughly synonymous, insofar as the history of imperialism is the history of the survival instinct writ large, but more on that later as well.