Incommensurability

Beyond intermediacy, there is what might be called the principle of incommensurability.  Although freedom is a necessary condition for morality, we recognize that it is not a sufficient condition.  Something more is needed, and I have expressed it elsewhere as "freedom must freely limit itself" for a condition of morality to exist.  It is this insufficiency that I term incommensurability because ultimately freedom and morality are incommensurate, as is freedom and justice.

There is an unfortunate anthropomorphism of "freedom," and I could have expressed it "a free people must freely limit themselves," but that too brings a number of new questions to the foreground.  Just what, for example, would we consider "a free people?"  I will let the statement stand with the understanding that it is precisely what must be explicated, and explicated within context.   I believe there are essentially four contexts:

i.  freedom and morality within the barbarian state
ii.  freedom and morality within the theocentric state
iii.  freedom and morality within the ideocentric state
iv. freedom and morality within the democratic state

In the background, of course, are notions of wealth, and the distribution of wealth, but I will deal with that within the analytical frame articulated within the last few posts -- that is to say, wealth is an instrumental means to an end.  Such is the immediate outline of the supreme fiction.