Utility

15.  The commonsensical claim that some acts are (others are not) instrumental to a given intentionality gives precedence to utility.  If I am in a state-of-being, subject to a subjectivity that I must free myself from, the utility of certain acts are set in relief, foregrounded against all the possible acts that might otherwise be free to engage.  I am suggesting, of course, the commonsensical idea that, in some absolute sense, I am free to do whatever I might do, but in some more immediate sense, some more pragmatic sense, I feel the limitations on my freedom first and foremost in the difference between the demands of utility and what is available as capacity.  Consider:  I am hungry, a subjectivity I must free myself from, and I am, in some absolute sense, free to do whatever I might do, but I am in circumstances far from Edenic.  There is food to be eaten, but it is not freely available, and I lack the means to purchase it.  I continue to suffer under my subjectivity, and ponder stealing the food.  Consider: I am evaluating my next move while my opponent is off in another room, and I see that I am stymied.  No matter how I move, I have no clear path to checkmate, and each move opens a path for my opponent.  I see, however, if one of my opponent's pawns were only positioned slightly differently, I would have a clear path.  I continue to suffer under my subjectivity, and ponder shifting his pawn.  There is a difference, of course, between the two considerations, and I might feel that I am more justified in meeting the demands of utility by stealing the food than cheating at chess (the stakes, after all, seem much higher in the former than the latter).  Finally, then, I am suggesting the likewise commonsensical idea that, in some absolute sense, I might have the capacity to act, but the demands of utility and my capacity to act do not, as it were, justify my acts.