Tuesday, January 3, 2012
The Good
14. Intentionality, then, regardless of its origins, subjects one to a given demand that we act, that one moves oneself from this state-of-affairs to that state-of-affairs. It is an act that brings me into being insofar as, on the one hand, I am inconceivable without motivating desire, this subjectivity, and on the other hand, I am engaged instrumentally in a transaction with the world, such as it is (a contingent reality that is, if not wholly intransigent, then independent of 'me,' a 'not-me,' an 'outside-me' that within which, on which, I must act). Here, I want to reiterate as well that this transaction with the world, such as it is, comes with guarantee. It may or may not prove efficacious, may be handled ineptly, and because we are not Adam in Eden, involves others who may (or may not) have my best interests at heart, as the example of chess illustrates. My freedom to act leaves open the possibility that I will not (perhaps cannot) free myself from my subjectivity, that an efficacious act does not present itself to me, or that an act that has proved efficacious in the past fails me, or the like. The instrumentality, the utility, of any instrumental act is always an open question, though clearly some questions are more open than others. One can imagine a digression on 'the good,' where 'the good' is always conceived as an instrumentality, a good-for-this-or-that, a good that is always to one degree or another contingent on my subjectivity within this world. I do not want to imply that 'the good' is a mere instrumentality, though it does imply some ambiguity in our use of 'the good,' where the shift from the adverbial this-is-good-for-that to the nominal this-is-the-good implies as well a shift from the qualitative assessment of this or that to the referential -- that 'the good' must refer to something in and of itself -- if not a person-place-or-thing, as such, then a moral and aesthetic imperative that transcends (and envelops) my particular subjectivity to this intentionality and its imperative to act within the world, on that world -- a good above and beyond me. It is "eating well" as opposed to simply "eating." The origins of this 'good,' whether a social or divine construct, and the imperative to act within it, my point to a difference in origin, but not of kind. It simply moves the bar. It is an intentionality-game among intentionality games, a subjectivity within a subjectivity.
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